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Abstract—The emerging edge computing paradigm promises to deliver superior user experience and enable a wide range of Internet
of Things (IoT) applications. In this work, we propose a new market-based framework for efficiently allocating resources of
heterogeneous capacity-limited edge nodes (EN) to multiple competing services at the network edge. By properly pricing the
geographically distributed ENs, the proposed framework generates a market equilibrium (ME) solution that not only maximizes the
edge computing resource utilization but also allocates optimal (i.e., utility-maximizing) resource bundles to the services given their
budget constraints. When the utility of a service is defined as the maximum revenue that the service can achieve from its resource
allotment, the equilibrium can be computed centrally by solving the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program. drawn from the economics
literature. We further show that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto-optimal and satisfies desired fairness properties including sharing
incentive, proportionality, and envy-freeness. Also, two distributed algorithms are introduced, which efficiently converge to an ME.
When each service aims to maximize its net profit (i.e., revenue minus cost) instead of the revenue, we derive a novel convex
optimization problem and rigorously prove that its solution is exactly an ME. Extensive numerical results are presented to validate the
effectiveness of the proposed techniques.
Index Terms—Market equilibrium, Fisher market, fairness, algorithmic game theory, edge computing, fog computing.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
The last decade has witnessed an explosion of data traffic
over the communication network attributed to the rapidly
growing cloud computing and pervasive mobile devices.
This trend is expected to continue for the foreseeable fu-
ture with a whole new generation of applications includ-
ing 4K/8K UHD video, hologram, interactive mobile gam-
ing, tactile Internet, virtual/augmented reality (VR/AR),
mission-critical communication, smart homes, and a variety
of IoT applications [1]. As the cloud infrastructure and
number of devices will continue to expand at an accelerated
rate, a tremendous burden will be put on the network.
Thus, it is imperative for network operators to develop
innovative solutions to meet the soaring traffic demand and
accommodate diverse requirements of various services and
use cases in the next generation communication network.
Thanks to the economy of scale and supercomputing
capability advantages, cloud computing will likely continue
to play a prominent role in the future computing landscape.
However, cloud data centers (DC) are often geographically
distant from the end-user, which induces enormous network
traffic, along with significant communication delay and jit-
ter. Hence, despite the immense power and potential, cloud
computing alone is facing growing limitations in satisfying
the stringent requirements in terms of latency, reliability,
security, mobility, and localization of many new systems
and applications (e.g., embedded artificial intelligence, man-
ufacture automation, 5G wireless systems) [1]. To this end,
edge computing (EC) [2], also known as fog computing
(FC) [1], has emerged as a new computing paradigm that
complements the cloud to enable the implementation of
innovative services right at the network edge.
EC forms a virtualized platform that distributes com-
puting, storage, control, and networking services closer to
end-users to smarten the edge network. The size of an EN is
flexible ranging from smartphones, PCs, smart access points
(AP), base stations (BS) to edge clouds [3]. For example,
a smartphone is the edge between wearable devices and
the cloud, a home gateway is the edge between smart
appliances and the cloud, a cloudlet, a telecom central office,
a micro DC is the edge between mobile devices and cloud
core network. Indeed, the distributed EC infrastructure en-
compasses any computing, storage, and networking nodes
along the path between end devices and cloud DCs, not
just exclusively nodes located at the customer edge [3].
By providing elastic resources and intelligence at the edge
of the network, EC offers many remarkable capabilities,
including local data processing and analytics, distributed
caching, location awareness, resource pooling and scaling,
enhanced privacy and security, and reliable connectivity.
These capabilities combined with the shorter communi-
cation distance allow operators to efficiently handle both
downstream and upstream data between the cloud and
the customer edge, which translates into drastic network
traffic reduction and significant user experience improve-
ment. For instance, with edge caching, location-awareness,
and real-time data processing and analysis, not only can
service providers serve user content requests locally, but
also can adaptively optimize video coding and resolution
according to the user device information and the varying
wireless channel conditions. Also, it is envisioned that most
of data produced by IoT sensors will be processed at the
edge and only important information and metadata will be
sent to the cloud for further analytics. Additionally, EC is
the key enabler for ultra-reliable low-latency applications
such as AR/VR, cognitive assistance, autonomous driving,
2industrial automation, remote robotics, and healthcare. A
myriad of benefits and other use cases (e.g., computation
offloading, caching, advertising, smart homes/grids/cities)
of EC can be found in [1]–[3].
Today, EC is still in the developing stages and presents
many new challenges, such as network architecture design,
programming models and abstracts, IoT support, service
placement, resource provisioning andmanagement, security
and privacy, incentive design, and reliability and scalability
of edge devices [1]–[3]. To unlock the huge potential of this
new technology, it requires significant collaborative efforts
between various entities in the ecosystem. In this work,
we focus on the EC resource allocation problem. Unlike
cloud computing, where computational capacity of large
DCs is virtually unlimited and network delay is high, EC is
characterized by relatively low network latency but consid-
erable processing delay due to the limited computing power
of ENs. Also, there are a massive number of distributed
computing nodes compared to a small number of large DCs.
Moreover, ENs may come with different sizes (e.g., number
of computing units) and configurations (e.g., computing
speed) ranging from a smartphone to an edge cloud with
tens/hundreds of servers. These nodes are dispersed in
numerous locations with varying network and service delay
towards end-users.
On the other hand, different services may have different
requirements and properties. Some services can only be
handled by ENs satisfying certain criteria. Additionally,
different services may be given different priorities. While
every service not only wants to obtain as much resource
as possible but also prefers to be served by its closest ENs
with low response time, the capacities of ENs are limited.
Also, due to the diverse preferences of the services towards
the ENs, some nodes can be under-demanded while other
nodes are over-demanded. Thus, a fundamental problem
is: given a set of geographically distributed heterogeneous ENs,
how can we efficiently allocate their limited computing resources
to competing services with different desires and characteristics,
considering service priority and fairness? This work introduces
a novel market-based solution framework which aims not
only to maximize the resource utilization of the ENs but also
to make every service happy with the allocation decision.
The basic idea behind our approach is to assign dif-
ferent prices to resources of different ENs. In particular,
highly sought-after resources are priced high while prices
of under-demanded resources are low. We assume that each
service has a certain budget for resource procurement. The
budget can be virtual or real money. Indeed, budget is
used to capture service priority/differentiation. It can also
be interpreted as the market power of each service. Given
the resource prices, each service buys the favorite resource
bundle that it can afford. When all the resources are fully
allocated, the resulting prices and allocation form a market
equilibrium (ME). If there is only one EN, an ME can be
found easily by adjusting the price gradually until demand
equals supply or locating the intersection of the demand and
supply curves. However, when there are multiple heteroge-
neous ENs andmultiple services with diverse objectives and
different buying power, the problem becomes challenging.
We consider two distinct market models in this work.
In the first model, the money does not have intrinsic
value to the services. Given resource prices, each service
aims to maximize its revenue from the allocated resources,
without caring about how much it has to pay as long as
the total payment does not exceed its budget. This model
arises in many real-world scenarios. For example, in 5G
networks, the Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) servers of
a Telco are shared among different network slices, each of
which runs a separate service (e.g., voice, video streaming,
AR/VR, connected vehicles, sensing) and serves a group of
customers who pay for the service. The Telco can allot dif-
ferent budgets to the slices depending on their importance
and/or potential revenue generation (e.g., the total fee paid
by the users/subscribers of each slice).
Similarly, an application provider (e.g., Uber, Pokemon
Go) or a sensor network may own a number of ENs in
a city and need to allocate the edge resources to handle
requests of different groups of users/sensors. The budget
can be decided based on criteria such as the populations
of users/sensors in different areas and/or payment levels
(subscription fees) of different groups of users. Another
example is that a university (or other organizations) can
grant different virtual budgets to different departments or
research labs so that they can fairly share the edge servers on
the campus. The first model may also emerge in the setting
of cloud federation at the edge where several companies
(i.e., services) pool their resources together and each of them
contributes a fixed portion of resource of every EN. Here,
the budgets are proportional to the initial contributions of
the companies. Instead of resource pooling, these companies
may agree upfront on their individual budgets, and then
buy/rent a given set of ENs together.
In these scenarios, it is important to consider both fair-
ness and efficiency. Thus, conventional schemes such as
social welfare maximization, maxmin fairness, and auction
models may not be suitable. In particular, a welfare max-
imization allocation often gives most of the resources to
users who have high marginal utilities while users with low
marginal utilities receive a very small amount of resources,
even nothing. Similarly, in auction models, the set of losers
are not allocated any resource. Hence, these solutions can be
unfair to some users. On the other hands, a maxmin fairness
solution often allocates too many resources to users with
low marginal utilities, hence, it may not be efficient.
To strive the balance between fairness and efficiency,
we advocate the General Equilibrium Theory [4], with a
specific focus on the Fisher market model [5], as an effec-
tive solution concept for this problem. Specifically, the first
model can be cast as a Fisher market in which services
act as buyers as ENs act as different goods in the market.
For the linear additive utility function as considered in this
work, given resource prices, a service may have an infinite
set of optimal resource bundles, which renders difficulty
in designing distributed algorithms. We suggest several
methods to overcome this challenge. Moreover, we show
that the obtained allocation is Pareto-optimal, which means
there is no other allocation that would make some service
better off without making someone else worse off [6]. In
other words, there is no strictly “better” allocation. Thus, a
Pareto-optimal allocation is efficient.
We furthermore link the ME to the fair division literature
[7] and prove that the allocation satisfies remarkable fairness
3properties including envy-freeness, sharing-incentive, and
proportionality, which provides strong incentives for the
services to participate in the proposed scheme. Indeed,
these properties were rarely investigated explicitly in the
ME literature. Envy-freenessmeans that every service prefers
its allocation to the allocation of any other service. In an
envy-free allocation, every service feels that its share is at
least as good as the share of any other service, and thus no
service feels envy. Sharing-incentive is another well-known
fairness concept. It ensures that services get better utilities
than what they would get in the proportional sharing scheme
that gives each service an amount of resource from every EN
proportional to its budget. Note that proportional sharing is
an intuitive way to share resources fairly in terms of quan-
tity. For the federation setting, sharing-incentive implies that
every service gets better off by pooling their resources (or
money) together. Finally, it is natural for a service to expect
to obtain a utility of at least b/B of the maximum utility
that it can achieve by getting all the resources, where b is
the payment of the service and B is the total payment of all
the services. The proportionality property guarantees that the
utility of every service at the ME is at least proportional to
its payment/budget. Thus, it makes every service feel fair
in terms of the achieved utility.
In the secondmodel, the money does have intrinsic value
to the services. The services not only want to maximize
their revenues but also want to minimize their payments.
In particular, each service aims to maximize the sum of its
remaining budget (i.e., surplus) and the revenue from the
procured resources, which is equivalent to maximizing the
net profit (i.e., revenue minus cost). This model is prevalent
in practice. For example, several service providers (SP), each
of which has a certain budget, may compete for the available
resources of an edge infrastructure provider (e.g., a Telco,
a broker). The SPs only pay for their allocated resources
and can take back their remaining budgets. Obviously, a SP
will only buy a computing unit if the potential gain from
that unit outweighs the cost. It is natural for the SPs to
maximize their net profits in this case. The traditional Fisher
market model does not capture this setting since the utility
functions of the services depend on the resource prices.
It is worth mentioning that, conventionally, the optimal
dual variables associated with the supply demand con-
straints (i.e., the capacity constraints of the ENs) are often
interpreted as the resource prices [32] and common ap-
proaches such as network utility maximization (NUM) [33]
can be used to compute an ME. However, these approaches
do not work for our models that take budget into considera-
tion. Indeed, the main difficulty in computing an ME in both
models stems from the budget constraints which contain
both the dual variables (i.e., prices) and primal variables
(i.e., allocation). In the second model, the prices also appear
in the objective functions of the services. Therefore, the ME
computation problem becomes challenging. Note that the
pair of equilibrium prices and equilibrium allocation has to
not only clear the market but also simultaneously maximize
the utility of every service (as elaborated later in Section 4).
Fortunately, for a wide class of utility functions, the
ME in the first model can be found by solving a simple
Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program [8]–[10]. However,
the EG program does not capture the ME in the second
model. Interesting, by reverse-engineering the structure of
the primal and dual programs in the first model, we can
rigorously construct a novel convex optimization problem
whose solution is an ME of the second model. Our main
contributions include:
• Modeling. We formulate a new market-based EC
resource allocation framework and advocate the
General Equilibrium theory as an effective solution
method for the proposed problem.
• Centralized solution. The unique ME in the first model
can be determined by the EG program.We also prove
some salient fairness features of the ME.
• Decentralized algorithms. We introduce several dis-
tributed algorithms that efficiently overcome the dif-
ficulty raised by the non-unique demand functions
of the services and converge to the ME.
• Extended Fisher market. We systematically derive a
new convex optimization problem whose optimal
solution is an exact ME in the extended Fisher market
model where buyers value the money.
• Performance Evaluation. Simulations are conducted to
illustrate the efficacy of the proposed techniques.
The rest of the report is organized as follows. Section
2 describes related work. The system model and problem
formulation are given in Section 3 and Section 4, respec-
tively. The centralized solution using the EG program is an-
alyzed in Section 5. Then, we introduce several distributed
algorithms in Section 6. The market model in which buyers
aim to maximize their net profits is studied in Section
7. Simulation results are shown in Section 8 followed by
conclusions and discussion of future work in Section 9.
2 RELATED WORK
The potential benefits and many technical aspects of EC
have been studied extensively in the recent literature. First,
the hybrid edge/fog-cloud system can be leveraged to im-
prove the performance of emerging applications such as
cloud gaming and healthcare [11], [12]. A. Mukherjee et.
al. [13] present a power and latency aware cloudlet selec-
tion strategy for computation offloading in a multi-cloudlet
environment. The tradeoff between power consumption
and service delay in a fog-cloud system is investigated
in [14] where the authors formulate a workload allocation
problem to minimize the system energy cost under latency
constraints. A latency aware workload offloading scheme
in a cloudlet network is formulated in [15] to minimize the
average response time for mobile users.
In [16], M. Jia et. al. explore the joint optimization of
cloudlet placement and user-to-cloudlet assignment to min-
imize service latency while considering load balancing. A
unified service placement and request dispatching frame-
work is presented in [17] to evaluate the tradeoffs between
the user access delay and service cost. Stackelberg game
and matching theory are employed in [18] to study the
joint optimization among data service operators (DSO), data
service subscribers (DSS), and a set of ENs in a three-
tier edge network where the DSOs can obtain computing
resources from different ENs to serve their DSSs.
Another major line of research has recently focused on
the joint allocation of communication and computational
4resources for task offloading in the Mobile Edge Computing
(MEC) environment [19]–[21]. MEC allows mobile devices
to offload computational tasks to resource-rich servers lo-
cated near or at cellular BSs, which could potentially reduce
the devices’ energy consumption and task execution delay.
However, these benefits could be jeopardized if multiple
users offload their tasks to MEC servers simultaneously.
In this case, a user may not only suffer severe interference
but also receive a very small amount of EC resource, which
would consequently reduce data rate, increase transmission
delay, and cause high task execution time on the servers.
Hence, offloading decision, allocation and scheduling of
radio resources, and computational resources should be
jointly considered in an integrated framework.
Instead of optimizing the overall system performance
from a single network operator’s point of view, we study
the EC resource allocation problem from the game theory
and market design perspectives [8]. Specifically, we exploit
the General Equilibrium [4], a Nobel prize-winning theory,
to construct an efficient market-based resource allocation
framework. Although this concept was proposed more
than 100 years ago [5], only until 1954, the existence of
an ME was proved under mild conditions in the seminal
work of Arrow and Debreu [4]. However, their proof of
existence based on fixed-point theorem is non-constructive
and does not give an algorithm to compute an equilibrium
[8]. Recently, theoretical computer scientists have expressed
great interests in understanding algorithmic aspects of the
General Equilibrium concept. Various efficient algorithms
and complexity analysis for ME computation have been
accomplished over the past decade [8], [22]–[26]. Note that
although the existence result has been established, there is
no general technique for computing an ME.
Our proposed models are inspired by the Fisher market
[5] which is a special case of the exchange market model in
the General Equilibrium theory. An exchange market model
consists of a set of economic agents trading different types
of divisible goods. Each agent has an initial endowment of
goods and a utility function representing her preferences
for the different bundles of goods. Given the goods’ prices,
every agent sells the initial endowment, and then uses the
revenue to buy the best bundle of goods they can afford
[4], [8]. The goal of the market is to find the equilibrium
prices and allocations that maximize every agent’s utility
respecting the budget constraint, and the market clears. In
the Fisher market model, every agent comes to the market
with an initial endowment of money only and wants to
buy goods available in the market. We cast the EC resource
allocation problem as a Fisher market. We not only show
appealing fairness properties of the equilibrium allocation,
but also introduce efficient distributed algorithms to find
an ME. More importantly, we systematically devise a new
and simple convex program to capture the market in which
money has intrinsic value to the buyers, which is beyond
the scope of the Fisher and exchange market models.
Note that there is a rich literature on cloud resource allo-
cation and pricing [34]. In [35], [36], the authors propose dif-
ferent profit maximization frameworks for cloud providers.
References [37]–[39] study how to efficiently share resource
and profit among cloud providers in a cloud federation.
Several resource procurement mechanisms are introduced
in [40] to assist a cloud user to select suitable cloud vendors
in a multi-cloud market. In [41], the interaction between
a cloud provider and multiple services is modeled as a
generalized Nash game. This model is extended to a multi-
cloud multi-service environment in [42]. A single-cloud
multi-service resource provision and pricing problem with
flat, on-demand, and on-spot VM instances is formulated in
[43] as a Stackelberg game, which not only maximizes the
revenue of the cloud provider but also minimizes costs of
the services.
Auction theory has been widely used to study cloud
resource allocation [44]–[46]. A typical system consists of
one or several clouds and multiple users. First, the users
submit bids, which include their desired resource bundles
in terms of VM types and quantities as well as the price that
they are willing to pay, to an auctioneer. Then, the auctioneer
solves a winner determination problem to identify accepted
bids. Finally, the auctioneer calculates the payment that each
winner needs to pay to ensure truthfulness. In auction, the
common objectives are to maximize the social welfare or
maximize the profit of the cloud provider. Additionally, only
winners receive cloud resources. Furthermore, most of ex-
isting auction models do not consider elastic user demands.
For example, previous works often assume that cloud users
are single-minded, who are interested in a specific bundle
only and have zero value for other bundles.
Different from the existing works on cloud economics
and resource allocation in general, our design objective is
to find a fair and efficient way to allocate resources from
multiple nodes (e.g., ENs) to budget-constrained agents (i.e.,
services), which makes every agent happy with her resource
allotment and ensures high edge resource utilization. The
proposedmodel also captures practical aspects, for example,
a service request can be served at different ENs and service
demands can be defined flexibly rather than fixed bundles
as in auction models.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
An EC environment is depicted in Fig. ??. Besides local
execution and remote processing at cloud DCs, data and
requests from end-devices (e.g., smartphones, set-top-boxes,
sensors) can be handled by the EC platform. Note that some
data and computing need to be done in the local to keep data
privacy. A request typically first goes to a Point of Aggre-
gation (PoA) (e.g., switches/routers, BSs, APs), then it will
be routed to an EN for processing. Indeed, enterprises, fac-
tories, organizations (e.g., hospitals, universities, museums),
commercial buildings (shopping malls, hotels, airports), and
other third parties (e.g., sensor networks) can also outsource
their services and computation to the intelligent edge net-
work. Furthermore, service/content/application providers
like Google, Netflix, and Facebook can proactively install
their content and services onto ENs to serve better their cus-
tomers. In the EC environment, various sources (e.g., smart-
phones, PCs, servers in a lab, underutilized small/medium
data centers in schools/hospitals/malls/enterprises, BSs,
telecom central offices) can act as ENs.
We consider a system encompassing various services
and a set of geographically distributed ENs with different
configurations and limited computing capacities. Each ser-
vice has a budget for resource procurement and wants to
5offload as many requests as possible to the edge network.
The value of an EN to a service is measured in terms of the
maximum revenue that it can generate by using the EN’s
resource. An EN may have different values to different ser-
vices. Since some ENs (e.g., ones with powerful servers) can
be over-demanded while some others are under-demanded,
it is desirable to harmonize the interests of the services so
that each service is happy with its allotment while ensuring
high resource utilization. An intuitive solution is to assign
prices to ENs and let each service choose its favorite re-
source bundle. We assume that there is a platform lying
between the services and the ENs. Based on the information
collected from the ENs (e.g., computing capacity) and the
services (e.g., budgets, preferences), the platform computes
an ME solution including resource prices and allocation,
which not only maximizes the satisfaction of every service
but also fully allocates the ENs’ resources.
In the first model, each service seeks solely to maximize
its revenue under the budget constraint, without concerning
about the money surplus after purchasing resources. This
can be the case where the services and ENs belong to the
same entity, and each service is assigned a virtual budget
representing the service’s priority. For instance, a Telco can
give different budgets to different network slices, each of
which runs a service (e.g., voice, video streaming, AR/VR,
connected vehicles). In the second model, the remaining
money does have intrinsic value to the services. In this case,
each service aims to maximize the sum of its remaining bud-
get and the revenue from the procured resources. For exam-
ple, this can be the case where services and ENs are owned
by different entities, and each SP (e.g., Google, Facebook,
enterprises) has a certain budget for leasing resources from
an infrastructure provider (e.g., a Telco). For simplicity, we
assume that the values of ENs to the services are fixed. Our
model can be extended to capture time-varying valuation in
a multi-period model by considering each pair of an EN and
a time slot as an independent EN.
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
4.1 EC Resource Allocation Problem
Let M, N , M, and N be the sets of ENs and services, and
the numbers of ENs and services, respectively. Denote i
as the service index and j as the EN index. We assume
that each EN j has cj homogeneous computing units (e.g.,
servers) [18]. If an EN has several types of computing units,
we can always divide the EN into several clusters, each of
which contains only homogeneous units. Then, each cluster
can be considered as a separate EN. While the computing
units in each EN are homogeneous, different ENs can have
different types of computing units. Let xi,j be the number of
computing units of EN j allocated to service i. The vector of
resources allocated to service i is xi =
(
xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,M
)
.
Finally, define Bi as the budget of service i.
Our goal is to compute an ME including an equilibrium
price vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pM ), where pj is price of EN j,
and a resource allocation matrix X , in which the element at
the ith row and jth column is xi,j . The utility Ui(xi, p) of
service i is defined as a function of the amount of resources
xi that it receives and the resource prices p. The capacity
constraint of ENs renders:
∑N
i=1 xi,j ≤ cj , ∀j ∈M. Without
loss of generality, we normalize the capacity of every EN to
be 1 (i.e., cj = 1, ∀j) and scale related parameters (e.g.,
price, resource allocation) accordingly. This normalization is
just to simplify expressions and equations. Hence, we have:∑N
i=1 xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j, xi,j ≥ 0, ∀j.
Each service is a player in our market game. Given a
price vector p, service i aims to maximize its utility Ui(xi, p)
subject to the budget constraint
∑
j xi,jpj ≤ Bi.
Definition 4.1. An ME solution (p∗,X∗) needs to satisfy the
two conditions:
• Condition 1: Given the equilibrium resource price
vector p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, ..., p
∗
M ), every service i receives
its optimal resource bundle x∗i , i.e., we have
x∗i = (x
∗
i,1, . . . , x
∗
i,M ) ∈ argmax
xi≥0;
∑
j p
∗
jxi,j≤Bi
Ui(xi, p
∗) (1)
• Condition 2: All the resources are fully allocated, i.e. ,
we have:
∑
i xi,j = 1, ∀j.
The first condition can be interpreted as the user satisfac-
tion condition while the second condition is often called the
market clearing condition in Economics [6]. The first condition
ensures that the equilibrium allocation x∗i maximizes the
utility of service i at the equilibrium prices p∗ considering
the user budget constraint. The second condition maximizes
the resource utilization of the ENs. It also means the ENs’
resources are fully sold in the market, which consequently
maximizes the profit of every EN since the equilibrium
prices are non-negative. The services are players competing
for the limited EC resources, while the platform tries to
satisfy the market clearing condition. Prices are used to
coordinate the market.
Let ui(xi) be the gain/profit/revenue of service i can
achieve from the procured resources. We consider two mod-
els. In the first model (basic model), every service i wants to
maximize Ui(xi, p) = ui(xi) and does not care about how
much it has to pay as long as the total payment is under its
budget. Here, utility of a service is its revenue. In the second
model, instead of revenue, the services aim to maximize
their net profits (i.e., revenue minus cost). The service utility
in this model is Ui(xi, p) = ui(xi)−
∑
j pjxi,j , ∀i. We focus
on the first model throughout the report. The second model
is examined in Section 7.
4.2 Service Utility Model
In practice, the services may use different criteria to define
ui(xi). Our framework takes ui(xi) as an input to compute
an ME solution. How each service evaluates the ENs is not
the focus of this work. While the proposed model is generic,
we consider linear functions for the ease of exploring the
framework. Extensions to more general functions will be
discussed throughout the work. Let ai,j be the gain of
service i from one unit of resource of EN j. Then, we have:
ui(xi) =
∑
j ai,jxi,j , ∀i.
In the following, we present an example of how ai,j
can be computed. We consider only delay-sensitive services,
which are also the main target application of EC. For
simplicity, we assume that the transmission bandwidth is
sufficiently large and the data size of a request is small
(e.g., Apple Siri, Google Voice Search, Google Maps, AR,
and Translation). Hence, the data transmission delay (i.e.,
6size/bandwidth) is assumed to be negligible and we con-
sider only propagation delay and processing delay [27], [41].
The total delay of a request of service i from the time a
user sends the request to the time she receives a response
includes the round-trip delay dUE−PoAi between the user
and a PoA of the service, the round-trip network delay dni,j
between the PoA and an EN i hosting the service, and the
processing delay at the EN dpi,j . Note that an EN can be
located in the same place with a PoA (e.g., a BS). In reality,
dUE−PoAi is quite small, and we assume it is fixed similar
to [15]. In other words, we study the system only from the
aggregation level to the EC platform. For simplicity, we assume
that each service is located at one PoA (e.g., an IoT gateway,
a BS, a building). If a service has several PoAs, we need
to take sum over all the PoAs to get the total number of
requests of the service handled by the EC platform. Denote
Tmaxi as the maximum tolerable delay of service i, we have
dpi,j + d
n
i,j ≤ T
max
i , ∀i, j. (2)
Obviously, the maximum number of requests λmaxi,j that EN
j can process is zero if dni,j ≥ T
max
i .
We model the processing delay at ENs using the widely
used M/G/1 queues and assume that the workload is
evenly shared among computing units [18], [27], [28], [41].
The average response time dpi,j of EN j for processing
service i can be computed as follows:
dpi,j =
1
µi,j −
λi,j
xi,j
, ∀i, j (3)
where µi,j be the service rate of one computing unit of EN
j for handling service i, and λi,j is the request arrival rate
(i.e., number of requests per time unit) of service i to EN j.
For queue stability, we have
λi,j
xi,j
< µi,j , ∀i, j. Otherwise,
the queuing delay will be infinite as requests accumulated.
From (3), we have
1
µi,j −
λi,j
xi,j
≤ Tmaxi − d
n
i,j (4)
⇒ λi,j ≤ xi,j
(
µi,j −
1
Tmaxi − di,j
)
.
Therefore, if dni,j < T
max
i , the maximum number of
requests that service i can process at EN j is
λmaxi,j = max
{
xi,j
(
µi,j −
1
Tmaxi − di,j
)
, 0
}
(5)
= xi,jqi,j , ∀i, j
where qi,j = max
{(
µi,j −
1
Tmaxi −di,j
)
, 0
}
. Define a success-
ful request as the request whose total delay is smaller or
equal to the maximum delay tolerance. Let ri be the benefit
of successfully serving one request of service i [18]. Then,
given xi,j computing units, the revenue of service i is
ui,j(xi,j) = riqi,jxi,j = ai,jxi,j , ∀i, j (6)
with ai,j = riqi,j . Thus, we have
ui(xi) =
M∑
j=1
ui,j =
M∑
j=1
ai,jxi,j , ∀i (7)
in which ai,j can be computed beforehand. Note that we
implicitly assume the request pool of a service is unlimited.
We will discuss later how some assumptions can be relaxed.
Definition 4.2. A function u(.) is homogeneous of degree d,
where d is a constant, if u(αx) = αdu(x), ∀ α > 0 [8].
From (7), it is easy to verify that ui(xi) is a linear function
that is homogeneous of degree 1.
Remark: The value of an EN to a service can be defined
flexibly. For example, a service may give higher values to
ENs in a populated area or ENs with high reliability. A
suitable weight can be added to ai,j . In the proposed model,
each service informs the platform its budget and how much
it values different ENs. Based on these information, the plat-
form computes suitable resource allocation satisfying given
design objectives. How each service utilizes its allocated
resources in the operation stage is not the focus of this
work. The key concern of our work is how to harmonize
the interests of different services that may have different
preferences towards the ENs. Also, we consider only delay-
sensitive services to illustrate one way to model the service
utility function. It can be justified by the fact that non-
delay-sensitive services can be handled effectively by cloud
DCs and the precious edge resources can be reserved for
important low-latency services. Nevertheless, our model is
generic enough to handle other service types as long as we
can define the utility of a service as a suitable function of
its allocated EC resources. Finally, although we consider
computing resources only, the proposed framework can
apply to a system in which each service evaluates an EN
based on a combination of different resource types of the
EN, such as computing, storage, and bandwidth.
5 CENTRALIZED SOLUTION
In the first model, each service i aims to maximize
Ui(xi, p) = ui(xi) =
∑
j ai,jxi,j subject to the budget
constraint
∑
j pjxi,j ≤ Bi, ∀i. If p is a price vector, the ratio
ai,j/pj is defined as the bang-per-buck of EN j to service
i, which indicates the utility gained by service i through
one unit of money spent on EN j (assuming 0/0 = 0). The
maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) of service i over the set of
ENs is αi = maxj{ai,j/pj} [22]. The demand set Di(p)
of service i includes all ENs giving it the MBB value, i.e.,
Di(p) = {j : ai,j/pj = αi}, ∀i. Intuitively, to maximize its
utility, each service will spend full budget to buy resources
from only ENs giving it the MBB. Therefore, a pair (X, p) is
an ME if: i) given prices p, service i will exhaust its budget
to buy resources only from ENs in Di(p); and ii) the market
clears at prices p. In the following, we will show that the
ME in the first model can be inferred from the optimal
solution of a convex optimization problem. Also, we will
describe some properties of the equilibrium. Specifically, for
the case of buyers with linear utilities, the ME can be found
by solving the EG convex program given below [8], [9]:
maximize
X ,u
N∑
i=1
Bi lnui (8)
subject to
ui =
M∑
j=1
ai,jxi,j , ∀i (9)
N∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j (10)
xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j. (11)
7This problem always has an interior feasible solution by
simply setting xi,j = ǫ > 0, for all i and j, where ǫ is suffi-
ciently small such that all constraints (50)-(51) are satisfied
with strict inequality. Hence, Slaters condition holds and the
the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary
and sufficient for optimality [32]. Denote ηi, pj , and νi,j as
the dual variables associated with constraints (49), (50), and
(51), respectively. We have the Lagrangian
L(u,X, η, p, ν) =
∑
i
Bi lnui +
∑
j
pj(1−
∑
i
xi,j) (12)
+
∑
i
ηi
(∑
j
ai,jxi,j − ui
)
+
∑
i
∑
j
νi,jxi,j .
The KKT conditions give
∂L
∂ui
=
Bi
ui
− ηi = 0, ∀i (13)
∂L
∂xi,j
= Bi
ai,j
ui
− pj + νi,j = 0, ∀i, j (14)
ui =
∑
j
ai,jxi,j , ∀i; pj(1 −
∑
i
xi,j) = 0, ∀j (15)
νi,jxi,j = 0, ∀i, j; pj ≥ 0, ∀j; νi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j. (16)
We can infer the following
∀i, j :
ui
Bi
≤
ai,j
pj
(17)
∀i, j : if xi,j > 0⇒ νi,j = 0⇒
ui
Bi
=
ai,j
pj
(18)
∀j : pj > 0⇒
∑
i
xi,j = 1;
∑
i
xi,j < 1⇒ pj = 0. (19)
If p is a price vector, the ratio ai,j/pj is defined as the
bang-per-buck of EN j to service i, which indicates the utility
gained by service i through one unit of money spent on EN
j (assuming 0/0 = 0). The maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) of
service i over the set of ENs is αi = maxj{ai,j/pj} [22]. The
demand set Di(p) of service i includes all ENs giving it the
MBB value, i.e., Di(p) = {j : ai,j/pj = αi}, ∀i.
The dual variable pj in the EG program can be inter-
preted as the price of EN j. Hence, conditions (77) and
(87) imply that xi,j > 0 if and only if j ∈ Di(p), i.e.,
each service buys resources only from ENs giving it the
MBB. This also maximizes ui(xi). The following theorem
captures the relationship between the EG program and the
ME solution as well as some properties of the equilibrium.
Theorem 5.1. The optimal solution to the EG convex pro-
gram (48)-(51) is an ME. Specifically, the Lagrangian dual
variables corresponding to the ENs’ capacity constraints
(50) are the equilibrium prices. At the equilibrium, the
resource allocation not only maximizes the utility but
also exhausts the budget of every service. Furthermore,
each service purchases resources only from ENs giving
its MBB. Additionally, the optimal utilities of the services
as well as equilibrium prices are unique.
Proof: Let X∗ and u∗i be the optimal solution to the EG pro-
gram. Then, X∗ and u∗i need to satisfy the KKT conditions
(73)-(88). Denote η∗, p∗, and ν∗ as the optimal dual variables.
From (74), we have
Bi
ai,j
u∗i
= p∗j − ν
∗
i,j , ∀i, j. (20)
Multiplying both sides of (20) by x∗i,j and adding the result-
ing equalities, we get
Bi
u∗i
∑
j
ai,jx
∗
i,j =
∑
j
(p∗j − ν
∗
i,j)x
∗
i,j , ∀i, j. (21)
Since ν∗i,jx
∗
i,j = 0, ∀i, j, and ui∗ =
∑
j ai,jx
∗
i,j , ∀i, equation
(21) implies
∑
j p
∗
jx
∗
i,j = Bi, ∀i. Thus, the optimal solution
to the EG program (48)-(51) fully exhausts the budget of
every service. Furthermore, as shown above, at the optimal-
ity, each service buys resources only from ENs giving its
MBB value. In other words, the optimal solution to the EG
program maximizes the utility of every service subject to
the budget constraint because every service uses all of its
money to purchase its MBB resources. This can be inferred
from (77) and (87).
We now consider the market clearing condition. From
(88), we can observe that resources of ENs with positive
price pj are fully allocated. For ENs with zero prices, their
resources can be allocated arbitrarily without affecting the
optimal utility of service since the price is zero [8]. Thus, the
market clears. Since (X∗, p∗) satisfies both conditions of an
ME, the optimal solution to the EG program is an ME.
Finally, since the objective function (48) is strictly con-
cave in ui for all i, the optimal utilities are unique. The
uniqueness of equilibrium prices can be inferred from (87).

From (20), if p∗j = 0, then ν
∗
i,j = 0 and ai,j = 0, ∀i, j,
which means an EN has price of zero only when it is not
wanted by all services. We can remove this EN from our
system. In the following, we consider only the case where
pj > 0, ∀j. Also, it can be shown that Theorem 5.1 is not only
applied to linear utilities, but also true for a wider class of
homogeneous concave utility functions [10]. Please refer to
Appendix D for more details.
Next, we study the properties of the equilibrium alloca-
tion. First, from (48)-(51), it can be easily verified that the
equilibrium allocation is scale-free. It means that it does not
matter if service i reports ai = (ai,1, . . . , ai,M ) or eiai for
some constant ei, the allocation that it receives is the same.
Also, if a service divides its budget into two parts and acts as
two different services with the same original utility function,
then the total allocation it obtains from the new ME is
equal to the original equilibrium allocation. Furthermore,
the equilibrium allocation is not only Pareto-optimal but
also possesses many appealing fairness properties such as
envy-freeness, sharing incentive, and proportionality.
An allocation is Pareto-optimal if there is no other al-
location that would make some service better off without
making someone else worse off [6], which means there is no
strictly “better” allocation. Hence, a Pareto-optimal alloca-
tion is efficient and non-wasteful because the remaining re-
sources (if any) cannot improve utility of any service. Envy-
freeness means that every service prefers its allocation to the
allocation of any other service. When the services have equal
budgets, an envy-free allocation X implies ui(xi) ≥ ui(xi′ )
for all i and i′ ∈ N [7]. In an envy-free allocation, every
service feels that her share is at least as good as the share
of any other service, and thus no service feels envy. Since
the budgets can be different, we need to extend the classical
definition of envy-freeness. An allocation X is envy-free if
ui(
xi
Bi
) ≥ ui(
xi′
Bi′
), ∀i, i′ ∈ N .
8Let xˆ be the allocation where each service receives
resource from every EN proportional to its budget, i.e.,
xˆi,j =
Bi∑
′
i Bi′
, ∀i, j. Sharing-incentive property implies
ui(xi) ≥ ui(xˆi), ∀i. Indeed, xˆ is an intuitive resource-
fair allocation that allocates resources from every EN to
each service proportional to the service budget. We can also
understand that each service i contributes an amount of xˆi,j
to EN j in a resource pool consisting of the ENs. Sharing-
incentive ensures that every service prefers the equilibrium
allocation to its initial resource contribution to the pool. This
can be interpreted as resource-fairness.
Finally, if ui(xi) ≥
Bi∑
i′ Bi′
ui(C), for all i, in which ui(C)
is the utility of service i when it receives all the resources
from the market (i.e., C = (1, ..., 1), C ∈ RM ), we say
that the allocation X satisfies the proportionality property.
Indeed, ui(C) is the maximum utility that every service
i can achieve from the EC resource pool. The proportion-
ality property guarantees that the utility of every service
at the ME is at least proportional to its payment/budget.
Thus, this property can be interpreted as utility-fairness.
Obviously, these fairness properties encourage services to
participate in the proposed resource allocation scheme.
Theorem 5.2.At equilibrium, the allocation is Pareto-optimal
and envy-free. It also satisfies the sharing-incentive and
proportionality properties.
Proof: Since at the equilibrium, every service exhausts its
budget and receives its favorite resource bundle, it does not
envy with other services. Hence, the equilibrium allocation
is envy-free. The Pareto-optimality follows directly from the
first-welfare theorem in Economics [6], [8]. Indeed, Pareto-
optimality can also be inferred from the Nash Bargaining
concept [31]. In particular, the problem (48)-(51) has the
objective in the form of a Nash Social Welfare function with
closed, compact, and convex feasible region. Thus, it enjoys
all compelling properties of a Nash Bargaining solution such
as Pareto efficiency and scale-invariance. For linear utilities,
we can prove the properties above directly as follows.
- Pareto Optimality: We show this by contradiction. As-
sume allocation X∗ is not Pareto-optimal. Then, there exists
an allocation X ′ such that ui(x
′
i) ≥ ui(x
∗
i ) for all i, and
ui(x
′
i) > ui(x
∗
i ) for some i. Note that ui(xi) =
∑
j ai,jxi,j .
Consider any feasible allocationX ′. Recall the MBB of buyer
i is αi = maxj
ai,j
pj
. We have
∑
j
x′i,jpj ≥
∑
j
x′i,j
ai,j
αi
≥
∑
j
x∗i,jai,j
1
αi
=
∑
j
x∗i,jpj. (22)
The second inequality is due to ui(x
′
i) ≥ ui(x
∗
i ), ∀i. Thus∑
j
x′i,jpj ≥ Bi, ∀i. (23)
Since ui(x
′
i) > ui(x
∗
i ) for some i,
∑
j x
′
i,jpj ≥ Bi for some
i. Adding both sides of (23) over all buyers renders
∑
i
Bi <
∑
i
∑
j
x′i,jpj =
∑
i
xi,j
∑
j
pj ≤
∑
j
pj (24)
because
∑
i x
′
i,j ≤ 1, ∀j (i.e., the capacity constraints of
ENs). However, (24) means the total prices of all the ENs
is greater than the total budget of all buyers, which cannot
occur. Thus, the equilibrium allocationX∗ is Pareto-optimal.
- Envy-freeness: To prove that X∗ is envy-free, we need
to show: Bi′ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ Biui(x
∗
i′ ), ∀i, i
′ ∈ N . Let bi,j be the
total money that service i spends on EN j. We have
Bi′ui(x
∗
i ) = Bi′
∑
j
ai,jx
∗
i,j = Bi′
∑
j
ai,j
b∗i,j
pj
(25)
= Bi′
∑
j
ai,j
pj
b∗i,j = B
′
iαi
∑
j
b∗i,j
= B′iαiBi = Biαi
∑
j
b∗i′,j
≥ Bi
∑
j
ai,j
pj
b∗i′,j = Bi
∑
j
ai,j
b∗i′,j
pj
= Bi
∑
j
ai,jx
∗
i′,j = Biui(x
∗
i′ ), ∀i, j.
Note that the equalities in the second line of (25) can be
inferred from the fact that each buyer only buys resources
from ENs in its demand set Di while the first inequality in
the fourth line holds because αi ≥
ai,j
pj
, ∀i, j.
- Proportionality: From Theorem 5.1,
∑
i x
∗
i,j = 1, ∀j.
Thus, for linear utilities and the envy-free property, we have
ui(C) = ui
(∑
i
x∗i
)
= ui
(
x∗i
)
+
∑
i′ 6=i
ui
(
x∗i′
)
(26)
≤ ui
(
x∗i
)
+
∑
i′ 6=i
Bi′
Bi
ui
(
x∗i
)
=
∑
i′ Bi′
Bi
ui
(
x∗i
)
.
Hence, ui(x
∗
i ) ≥
Bi∑
i′ Bi′
ui(C), ∀i.
- Sharing-incentive: At the ME (X∗, p∗), no service spends
more than its budget. We have
∑
i
∑
j
x∗i,jp
∗
j ≤
∑
i
Bi ⇒
∑
j
p∗j
∑
i
x∗i,j ≤
∑
i
Bi (27)
Thus,
∑
j p
∗
j ≤
∑
iBi. Consequently, resource bundle xˆi
costs service i:
∑
j xˆi,jp
∗
j =
∑
j
Bi∑
i′ Bi′
p∗j ≤ Bi, ∀i. So,
service i can afford to buy bundle xˆi at prices p
∗. However,
out of all feasible bundles that are affordable to service i, its
favorite one is x∗i . It means ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(xˆi), ∀i. 
6 DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION
A common approach for implementing distributed algo-
rithm is to let the platform iteratively compute prices of the
ENs and broadcast the updated prices to the services. Then,
each service finds its optimal demand bundle and sends the
updated demand to the platform. This price-based strategy
can be implemented in a tatonnment style or using the dual
decomposition method [33]. Unfortunately, linear utilities
may result in non-unique optimal demand bundles because
multiple ENs may give the same MBB to a buyer. Hence,
the algorithm cannot terminate without aggregated demand
coordination from the platform. Consider an example with
two services and three ENs. The system parameters are: B1
= $1, B2 = $4, a1 = (1, 10, 4), and a2 = (4, 8, 8).
Fig. 1(a) presents the ME from the centralized EG pro-
gram. The value associated with each edge between a ser-
vice and an EN indicates the amount of resource that the
service buys from the EN. For example, in Fig. 1(a), we
have: x1,1 = 0, x1,2 = 0.5, and x1,3 = 0. The equilibrium
price vector is p = (1, 2, 2). The demand sets are: D1 = {2}
and D2 = {1, 2, 3}. Given the equilibrium prices, the set of
9optimal (i.e., utility-maximizing) resource bundles of service
2 is infinite. Hence, even if a distributed algorithm reaches
the exact equilibrium prices at some iteration, it may not
stop since the total demand reported by the buyers may not
equal to the total supply. For instance, in Fig. 1(b), although
the platform announces the exact equilibrium prices, service
2 may choose to buy all resources from EN2 and EN3. Then,
the algorithm may never terminate. In the following, we
present two distributed algorithms to find the ME.
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Fig. 1: Market equilibrium with linear utilities
6.1 Dual Decomposition with Function Approximation
Using Lagrangian relaxation [32], [33], we can decompose
the EG convex program into sub-problems, each of which
can be solved by a service. We observe that the EG program
(48)-(51) can be written equivalently as follows.
maximize
X
N∑
i=1
Bi lnui(xi) (28)
subject to
N∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j; xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
Relaxing the coupling constraints, the partial Lagrangian is
L(X, p) =
∑
i
Bi lnui(xi) +
∑
j
pj
(
1−
∑
i
xi,j
)
(29)
=
∑
i
(
Bi lnui(xi)−
∑
j
pjxi,j
)
+
∑
j
pj .
Thus, given a price vector p, each service solves
maximize
xi≥0
Bi lnui(xi)−
∑
j
pjxi,j . (30)
To overcome the difficulty raised by the non-uniqueness
of the optimal demand of the services with linear utilities,
we propose to approximate the linear utility function by
a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function, which
is widely used in Economics and Computer Science [6],
[8]. A CES function has the following form: uCESi (xi) =(∑M
j=1(ai,jxi,j)
ρ
) 1
ρ
, ρ < 1, ρ 6= 0. Indeed, the linear utility
function is a special case of the CES function family as ρ →
1. We can approximate the original linear utility function by
a CES function where ρ = 1−ǫwith ǫ is arbitrarily small. As
ǫ→ 0, uCESi → ui. Clearly, a CES function is strictly concave
and homogeneous [6]. Hence, the EG program and Theorem
5.1 also apply to CES functions [8], [10]. Additionally, we can
observe that maximizing a CES function above is equivalent
to maximizing ui(xi) =
∑
j(ai,jxi,j)
ρ. Since a CES function
is strictly concave, the optimal demand bundle of a service
is unique. Consider the following optimization problem
maximize
xi≥0
ui(xi) subject to
∑
j
pjxi,j ≤ Bi. (31)
Proposition 6.1. Given a positive price vector p and a CES
approximation function, each service i can either solve
Problem (38) or Problem (36). Both the problems have
the same closed form solution as follows:
xi,j =
(aρi,j
pj
) 1
1−ρ Bi
∑M
j=1
(
ai,j
pj
) ρ
1−ρ
. (32)
Proof: Refer to Appendix A. 
Thus, based on the dual decomposition method where
each service solves the sub-problem (38), we have the fol-
lowing distributed algorithm with CES function approxima-
tion (Algorithm 1). With a sufficiently small step size, it is
guaranteed to terminate and converge to an (approximate)
global optimal solution [32], [33]. Our simulation results
confirm that Algorithm 1 produces a solution arbitrarily
close to the optimal one from the centralized EG program.
Algorithm 1 FUNCTION APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM
1: Initialization: iteration t = 0, set initial prices of ENs p(0) = p0, and
set step size α(0) and tolerance γ to be small.
2: repeat
3: At iteration t, the platform broadcasts prices p(t) to the buyers.
4: Each buyer computes its optimal demand xi(t) using (39) and
sends it to the platform.
5: The platform updates the prices
pj(t+ 1) = max
{
pj(t) + α(t)
(
1−∑Ni=1 xi,j(t)
)
, 0
}
, ∀j
6: until
∣∣pj(t + 1) − pj(t)
∣∣ < γ, ∀j, or the number of iterations t is
too large.
7: Output: equilibrium prices p∗ and optimal allocation X∗.
6.2 Proportional Response Dynamics Strategy
In this section, we present the Proportional Response Dy-
namics (PropDyn) algorithm proposed by the P2P com-
munity. This distributed algorithm is very simple to im-
plement and has been proved to converge to an ME [29].
Basically, in every iteration t, each service updates its bids
proportional to the utilities it receives from the previous
iteration. Specifically, bi,j(t) = Bi
ui,j(t−1)
ui(t−1)
, ∀i, j, t. Since
the ENs’ capacities are normalized, the price of an EN
equals to the total bids sent to it, i.e., pj(t) =
∑
i bi,j(t).
By bidding bi,j(t − 1) to EN j, service i obtains an amount
of resource xi,j(t − 1) = bi,j(t − 1)/pj , and gains a utility
ui,j(t−1) = ai,jxi,j(t−1). Finally, ui(t−1) =
∑
j ui,j(t−1)
is the total utility of service i at iteration t − 1. The salient
feature of this algorithm is that it can be implemented
efficiently in a distributed manner. In particular, each EN
only needs to know the total bid that it receives to compute
the price while each buyer only needs to know its own
information and learns its utilities achieved in the previous
iteration to compute its new bids. The algorithm terminates
when the price deviation of every EN is sufficiently small
[29]. The major difference between this novel algorithm and
traditional distributed algorithms is that in each iteration,
every service computes its new bids as mentioned above
instead of its optimal demand bundle.
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Algorithm 2 BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS ALGORITHM [30]
1: Sort ENs according to the decreasing order of
ai,j
b−i,j
.
Output a sorted list Li = {i1, i2, . . . , iM}.
2: Find the largest k such that
√
ai,ik
b−i,ik∑
k
j=1
√
ai,ij
b−i,ij
(
Bi +
∑k
j=1 b−i,ij
)
− b−i,ik ≥ 0
3: Set bil = 0 for l > k, and for 1 ≤ l ≤ k, set
bil =
√
ai,il
b−i,il∑k
j=1
√
ai,ij
b−i,ij
(
Bi +
∑k
j=1 b−i,ij
)
− b−i,il
To illustrate the effectiveness of the PropDyn mecha-
nism as well as the ME concept, we compare it with the
Proportional Sharing Best Response (BR)mechanism (PropBR)
proposed in [30], which aims to find a Nash Equilibrium
(NE). In a non-cooperative game, a NE is a stable state of
a system where no player can gain by a unilateral change
of strategy if the strategies of the others are fixed [8]. Both
[29] and [30] study a proportional sharing system where
the resource of every node is shared proportionally to
the services according to their bids. Specifically, we have
xi,j =
bi,j
bi,j+b−i,j
, ∀i, j, where b−i,j is the total bid of all
the services except i. In both mechanisms, the actions of the
services are the bids (bi,j) submitted to the ENs. However,
instead of updating its bids following the rule in PropDyn,
each service in the PropBR mechanism tries to selfishly
maximize its utility given strategies taken by other services
[30].
Algorithm 2 is the BR algorithm that buyer iwill execute
given the total bid b−i,j of other buyers. The whole algo-
rithm is implemented in rounds. In each round, each buyer
in turns runs Algorithm 2 and updates its bid vector bi to
the platform. The platform broadcasts new bids to all buyers
in the system. A round completes when all buyers have
updated their bids. Obviously, whenever this BR dynamics
strategy converges, it converges to an NE. As mentioned in
[30], the algorithm normally converges after a few rounds.
Interestingly, our simulation shows that buyers do not
gain significantly by playing BR. Indeed, most of buyers
achieve lower utilities in the PropBR scheme compared to
the PropDyn scheme. Furthermore, to play BR dynamics,
each buyer has to know total bids of others and the actual
capacity of every EN [30]. In PropDyn, buyers only need
to know their own information. Therefore, in a proportional
sharing system, buyers may not have incentives to play BR.
7 NET PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
Different from the basic model, in the second model, the
services try to optimize their net profits (i.e., revenue minus
cost) instead of revenue. Specifically, the net profit of service
i is vi(xi) =
∑
j(ai,j − pj)xi,j , ∀i. Given prices p, the
objective of service i is to maximize Ui(xi, p) = vi(xi)
subject to:
∑
j xi,jpj ≤ Bi, ∀i and xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j.
Indeed, maximizing the net profit vi(xi) is equivalent to
maximizing
∑
j(ai,j−pj)xi,j+Bi =
∑
j ai,jxi,j+si, where
si = Bi −
∑
j pjxi,j is the surplus money of service i after
purchasing xi. Inspired by the EG program for the basic
model, we would like to construct a similar convex program
to capture the ME in this new model.
Note that without budget consideration, this game-
theoretic problem can be solved efficiently by writing down
a social welfare maximization problem (i.e., maximizing
sum of utilities of all the services), then use the dual decom-
position method [33] to decompose it into sub-problems,
each of which is solved by one service. Each sub-problem
is exactly a net profit maximization problem of a service.
Unfortunately, this strategy fails when we consider budget
since the social welfare maximization problem cannot be
decomposed due to the coupling budget constraints.
Our derivation of the new convex optimization problem
is based on reverse-engineering the basic model.
Proposition 7.1. The equilibrium prices in the basic model
can be found by solving the following convex problem.
minimize
p,η
M∑
j=1
pj −
N∑
i=1
Bi ln(ηi) (33)
subject to pj ≥ ai,jηi, ∀i, j; pj ≥ 0, ∀j.
Proof: We can obtain this convex problem by using La-
grangian and Fenchel conjugate function [32] to construct
the dual problem of the original EG program. Indeed, ηi
and pj are the dual variables associated with (49) and (50).
See our Appendix B for the full proof. 
Clearly, to maximize vi(xi) =
∑
j(ai,j − pj)xi,j , service
i will never buy resource from EN j if ai,j < pj . In other
words, service i would only buy resources from ENs in the
set Ai =
{
j :
pj
ai,j
≤ 1
}
. From (61), we have ηi ≤
pj
ai,j
, ∀i.
From these observations, we conjecture that the following
prorgram captures the equilibrium prices in our second
market model (i.e., net profit maximization).
minimize
p,η
M∑
j=1
pj −
N∑
i=1
Bi ln(ηi) (34)
subject to
pj ≥ ai,jηi, ∀i, j; ηi ≤ 1, ∀i; ηi ≥ 0, ∀i; pj ≥ 0, ∀j.
Theorem 7.2. The solution of the following convex program
is exactly an ME of the new market model.
maximize
X ,u,s
N∑
i=1
(
Bi lnui − si
)
(35)
subject to ui ≤
M∑
j=1
ai,jxi,j + si, ∀i
N∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j;xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j; si ≥ 0, ∀i.
At the equilibrium, the total of money spent and surplus
money of every service equals to its budget. Addition-
ally, the optimal utility of every service is unique and
greater or equal to its budget. For any buyer who has
surplus money, her utility equals her budget.
Proof: See our Appendix C . 
The convex problem (63) is indeed the dual program
of problem (62). We can interpret problem (63) as follows.
First, the utility of a service is the sum of its revenue and its
surplus money. The first part of the objective function is the
weighted sum of logarithmic utilities of the services similar
to that of the EG program. However, since the surplus
money does not contribute (i.e., not visible) to the market,
we should subtract this amount from the aggregated utility
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function, i.e., the objective function. Finally, similar to the
EG program, although budget constraints are not included
in (63), the optimal solution satisfies these constraints. It
is worth noting that, somewhat surprisingly, although our
reverse-engineering approach is specialized for linear rev-
enue functions only, the convex program (63) works also for
a wider class of homogeneous concave revenue functions.
Interested readers can find more details in Appendix E.
8 NUMERICAL RESULTS
8.1 Simulation Settings
We consider a square area with dimensions of 10km x 10km.
The locations of ENs and services are generated randomly in
the area. We generate a total of 100 ENs and 1000 locations.
We assume that each service is located at one location. For
the sake of clarity in analysis, in the base case, we consider
a small system with 8 ENs and 4 services (i.e., M = 8 and N
= 4), which are selected randomly in the set of 100 ENs and
1000 services. The network delay between a service and an
EN is assumed to be proportional to the distance between
them. The maximum tolerable delay of the services follows
a uniform distribution over the interval [15, 25]. The service
rate µi,j is generated randomly from 80 to 240 requests
per time unit. The service price is from 2 to 3 per 100000
requests. The number of computing units in the ENs ranges
from 10 to 20. From these parameters, we can compute ai,j
of the services as in (6). The net profit maximizationmodel is
considered in Section 8.5. In the base case, we assume that
the services have equal budget. Fig. 2 depicts the valuations
of the ENs to the buyers in the base case. The base case is
used in all the simulations unless mentioned otherwise.
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Fig. 2: Valuations of ENs to the buyers
8.2 Performance Comparison
In the first model captured by the EG program, the absolute
value of the budget only affects the equilibrium prices by a
scaling factor (e.g., all the prices increase twice as the budget
of every service is double) and does not affect the allocation
and utilities of the services. The budget is normalized such
that the total budget of all services is one. The prices act as
a means to allocate resources only.
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Fig. 3: Performance comparison
We consider five schemes, including: the proposed ME,
the proportional sharing (Prop.), the social welfare maxi-
mization with equal weights (SW1), social welfare maxi-
mization with different weights (SW2), and the maxmin
fairness (maxmin) schemes. In the proportional sharing, each
buyer i receives Bi∑
i Bi
portion of resource of every EN.
In the social welfare maximization schemes, budget is not
considered, and the objective is to maximize
∑
iwiui(xi)
subject to the capacity constraints of the ENs. wi is the
weighting factor of service i. In SW1, all weights are equal.
In SW2, the weight of each service is its budget. Finally,
without budget consideration, the maxmin scheme aims to
maximize mini ui(xi) under ENs’ capacity constraints.
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Fig. 4: Utility efficiency comparison (N = 4)
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Fig. 5: Envy-freeness comparison (N = 4)
Figs. 3(a)–5(b) present performance comparison among
these schemes under both equal budget and different bud-
get settings. We can observe that the ME scheme balances
well the tradeoff between system efficiency and fairness.
First, the ME scheme considerably outperforms the Prop.
scheme, which confirms the sharing-incentive property of
the ME solution. The maxmin scheme produces a fair al-
location among the buyers but the total utility of the
buyers is much lower compared to other schemes. No-
ticeably, although the total utility is largest, both schemes
SW1 and SW2 produce undesirable allocations since some
buyers (e.g., buyer 1) are not allocated anything and have
zero utility in these schemes. Also, as can be seen from
Figs. 5(a), 5(b) which compare envy-freeness indices (EF =
mini,j
ui(xi)/Bi
ui(xj)/Bj
[30]) among the different schemes. An al-
location is envy-free if EF equals to one. We can observe
that our proposed ME scheme significantly outperforms the
social welfare maximization and maxmin schemes in terms
of envy-free fairness. Finally, Figs. fig:pr1–fig:pr3 depict
the proportionality ratio (PR) of different schemes. When
there are 4 buyers with equal budget, every buyer naturally
expects to obtain a PR of at least 1/4. It can be observed
that our proposed ME scheme satisfies the proportionality
property as shown in Theorem 5.2.
8.3 Sensitivity Analysis
First, we examine the impact of budget on the equilibrium
allocation by varying the budget ratio among the buyers.
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Fig. 6: Proportionality ratio comparison (N = 4, same budget)
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Fig. 7: Impact of budget ratio on the equilibrium allocation
Figs. 7(a)-7(c) show impact of budget on the equilibrium
allocation as we vary the budget ratio between services 1
and 2. We observe that buyer 1 is allocated more resources
as her budget increases, which also increases her utility.
The allocation and utility of buyer 2 decrease as her budget
decreases. Fig. 8 further supports this observation where r
is the budget ratio between services 1 and 2. Hence, we can
conclude that the proposed algorithm is effective to capture
service priority in terms of budget in the allocation decision.
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Fig. 8: Impact of budget ratio on the buyers’ utilities
Fig. 9 shows the dependence of the equilibrium prices on
the budget ratio of the buyers. For example, since only EN2,
EN7, and EN8 can satisfy the delay requirement of service 1
as seen in Fig. 2, the prices of EN7 and EN8 change consid-
erably as budget of service 1 varies. Also, because EN5 and
EN6 are less valuable to the buyers, their equilibrium prices
are significantly lower than the prices of other ENs while
the prices of EN2 and EN8 are highest because they have
high values to all the buyers. These observations imply the
proposed method is effective in pricing.
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Fig. 9: Impact of budget ratio on the equilibrium prices
In Fig. 10, we change the equilibrium prices by a small
amount to obtain different price vectors P1, P2, P3, P4
such that demand of each buyer at these prices is unique.
Price vector P1 (P2) is obtained by increasing (decreasing)
every price in the equilibrium price vector in the base case
by 0.01. Price vectors P3 (P4) is generated by adding a ran-
dom number between 0 and 0.0005 (0.0003). We can observe
that even under small price variation, the market is not
cleared. Some ENs are over-demanded while some others
are under-demanded. It means proper equilibrium pricing is
important to clear the market.
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Fig. 10: Impact of resource prices on total demand
The impact of the number of players (i.e., number of
ENs and number of services) on the ME is illustrated in
Figs. 11(a), 11(b). The buyers have the same budget in this
case. We show the utilities of buyers 1, 2, 3, and 4 in these
figures. As expected, as the number of buyers increases,
the utility of individual buyer decreases since the same
set of ENs has to be shared among more services. On the
other hand, the service utility increases significantly as the
number of ENs increases.
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Fig. 11: Impact of M and N on the players’ utilities
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8.4 Analysis of Distributed Algorithms
8.4.1 Proportional Dynamics Allocation
The proportional dynamics mechanism (PropDyn) has low
complexity and can be implemented in a distributed man-
ner. The convergence properties of this algorithm in the base
case with 8 ENs and 4 services is shown in Figs. 12(a), 12(b).
As we can see, the prices and the bids converge after a few
tens of iterations. The running time of the algorithm is in
order of milliseconds. Figs. 77–13(d) show the convergence
properties of PropDyn as we change the number of ENs
and the number of services. The the stopping condition is
defined according the relative change of the prices between
iterations (i.e., absolute value of the price deviation over the
price in the previous iteration). In other words, at iteration
t+1, ifmaxj
(
|pj(t+1)− pj(t)|/pj(t)
)
is sufficiently small
(i.e., smaller than a tolerance threshold), the PropDyn algo-
rithm terminates/converges. We have plotted the number
of iterations of the PropDyn algorithm with different values
of number of services (N) and number of ENs (M) as well
as different tolerance thresholds in Figs. 77–13(d). The goal
of these figures is to give a rough idea about the number
of iterations. For each of these figures, we generated 50
different datasets and took the average number of iterations
over 50 runs. Theoretical results on the convergence rate
of PropDyn can be found in [?], [?], [29]. Specifically, the
number of iterations depends on the number of ENs, the
tolerance threshold, and the system parameters ai,j-which
is indirectly related to the number of services.
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Fig. 13: Number of iterations of PropDyn
Figs. 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) compare the buyers’ utilities in
the PropDyn and PropBR schemes. We select a particular
instance with a set of 10 buyers and 20 ENs from the
generated system data. Note that we have run simulation
with numerous instances and obtain similar trends. The
utility of each buyer in the particular instance is presented
in Fig. 14(a). As we can see, the utility values are higher
for most of the buyers in the PropDyn scheme compared to
the those in the PropBR scheme. In 14(b), we add a random
variable to each ai,j and run the schemes 100 times and take
the average results. In 14(c), we generate ai,j randomly in
the range between 0.01 and 0.09. As we can observe, the
buyers’ utilities tend to be higher in the PropDyn scheme
in comparison with the PropBR scheme. Furthermore, the
PropBR requires buyers to know more system information
to play their BR actions in each round. The numerical results
show that it brings almost no benefit to the buyers (no utility
gain in most cases) to play PropBR scheme.. Hence, we can
infer that the buyers should just follow the PropDyn scheme and
obtain an ME allocation.
8.4.2 Function Approximation Algorithm
The convergence properties of the CES approximation
scheme as well as its performance are reported. Thanks to
the closed form expression of the optimal demand, the algo-
rithm runs very fast even with high number of iterations. As
expected, the number of iterations depends strongly on the
step size and the initial prices. The convergence of EN6’s
price (p6) is shown in Fig. 15(a). The number of iterations
decreases as the initial prices are close to the final ME prices,
which are unknown. The number of iterations decreases
as the step size increases, but we cannot increase the step
size γ too much to ensure convergence. Fig. 15(b) presents
the price traces of different ENs until convergence with
α = 0.001 and p0 = 0.2.
In Fig. 16(a), we study the performance of the approxi-
mation scheme by comparing utility of the buyers under the
centralized convex program (EG), the approximation CES
utility (CES), and the approximation linear utility (Approx.).
In the Approx. scheme, the utility of buyer i is xi,jai,j where
xi,j is the solution of the optimization problem with CES
approximation utilities. As we can observe, the values of the
utilities are very similar, which confirms that the proposed
approximation scheme performs well. In this figure, we set
ρ to be 0.99. Finally, the equilibrium prices with different
values of ρ is shown in Fig. 16(b). It is easy to see that the
prices are almost equal for different values of ρ.
8.5 Net Profit Maximization Model
We now evaluate the second model where the services aim
to maximize their net profits. We use the same system
setting with 4 services and 8 ENs in the base case as before.
From the objective function of the buyer, we know that a
buyer will buy resource from an EN only when the price of
the EN is less than or equal to its utility gain from the EN.
In the revenue maximization case as in the basic model, the
equilibrium prices increase linearly at the same rate as the
budget. However, as can be seen in Fig. 17(a), this prop-
erty does not hold in the net profit maximization model.
Budget scale is the scaling factor by which we multiply
the original budget. The figure shows that the equilibrium
prices increase then become saturated after certain values of
the budgets. At these (saturated) prices, buying resources
from the ENs or not does not change the utility for a
buyer (i.e., pj = ai,j). When the budget is large enough,
14
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Fig. 14: Utility comparison between PropBR and PropDyn
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the utilities of the buyers become equal to their budgets.
It means procuring resources or not does not bring any
additional benefit to the buyers. These results are shown
in Figs. 17(b), 17(c).
Figs. 18(a), 18(b) present equilibrium prices and opti-
mal utilities, respectively, as the budget varies. Rev.max
corresponds to the first model (i.e., revenue maximization)
with scale equal to 1. As we can observe, for the same
budget (i.e., scale = 1), equilibrium prices in the second
model are smaller than equilibrium prices in the first model
because in the net profit maximization model, a service
only buys resource from an EN that gives it positive gain.
Also, the service utilities at the equilibrium in the second
model is greater than those in the first model due to lower
equilibrium prices and budget surplus is considered in the
second model. Finally, in the second model, the equilibrium
prices and optimal utilities increase as the budget increases.
As explained above, equilibrium prices become saturated in
the second model at certain points. Hence, the equilibrium
prices increase very little as budget scale increases from 1 to
1.5.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this work, we consider the resource allocation for an EC
system which consists geographically distributed heteroge-
neous ENs with different configurations and a collection of
services with different desires and buying power. Our main
contribution is to suggest the famous concept of General
Equilibrium in Economics as an effective solution for the
underlying EC resource allocation problem. The proposed
solution produces an ME that not only Pareto-efficient but
also possesses many attractive fairness properties. The po-
tential of this approach are well beyond EC applications.
For example, it can be used to share storage space in edge
caches to different service providers. We can also utilize the
proposed framework to share resources (e.g., communica-
tion, wireless channels) to different users or groups of users
(instead of services and service providers). Furthermore, the
proposed model can extend to the multi-resource scenario
where each buyer needs a combination of different resource
types (e.g., storage, bandwidth, and compute) to run its
service. We will formally report these cases (e.g., network
slicing, NFV chaining applications) in our future work.
The proposed framework could serve as a first step to
understand new business models and unlock the enormous
potential of the future EC ecosystem. There are several
future research directions. For example, we will investigate
the ME concept in the case when several edge networks
cooperate with each other to form an edge/fog federation.
Investigating the impacts of the strategic behavior on the
efficiency of the ME is another interesting topic. Note that
N. Chen et. al. [24] have shown that the gains of buyers for
strategic behavior in Fisher markets are small. Additionally,
in this work, we implicitly assume the demand of every
service is unlimited. It can be verified that we can add the
maximum number of requests constraints to the EG pro-
gram to capture the limited demand case, and the solution of
this modified problem is indeed an ME. However, although
the optimal utilities of the services in this case are unique,
there can have infinite number of equilibrium prices. We
are investigating this problem in our ongoing work. Also,
integrating the operation cost of ENs into the proposed ME
framework is a subject of our future work. Finally, how
to compute market equilibria with more complex utility
functions that capture practical aspects such as task moving
expenses among ENs and data privacy is an interesting
future research direction.
’
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.1
Consider two following problems
(P1) maximize
xi≥0
ui(xi) (36)
subject to
∑
j
pjxi,j ≤ Bi (37)
(P2) maximize
xi≥0
Bi lnui(xi)−
∑
j
pjxi,j (38)
where ui(xi) =
∑
j
(
ai,jxi,j
)ρ
. We will show that the given
a positive price vector p, each service i can solve either (P1)
or (P2), which have the same optimal solution.
xi,j =
(aρi,j
pj
) 1
1−ρ Bi
∑M
j=1
(
ai,j
pj
) ρ
1−ρ
, ∀i, j. (39)
Consider (P1). Let λi is the dual variable associated with
constraint (37). The Lagrangian is
Li(xi, λi) =
∑
j
(
ai,jxi,j
)ρ
+ λi
(
Bi −
∑
j
pjxi,j
)
(40)
Take the first derivative and set it equal to zero, we have
∂Li
∂xi,j
= ρai,j
(
ai,jxi,j
)ρ−1
− λipj = 0, ∀j. (41)
⇒ ρaρi,jx
ρ−1
i,j = λipj, ∀j. (42)
If λi = 0⇒ ai,jxi,j = 0, ∀j ⇒ ui(xi) = 0. Clearly, optimal
value of ui(xi) > 0. Hence, λi > 0. Also, as mentioned in
the report, pj > 0, ∀j. Thus, xi,j > 0, ∀j. From (42), we
have
ρaρi,kx
ρ−1
i,k = λipk, ∀k ∈M. (43)
Since at least one element of vector ai is positive, we assume
ai,j > 0. From (42) and (43), we have
ρaρi,kx
ρ−1
i,k
ρaρi,jx
ρ−1
i,j
=
pk
pj
, ∀k ∈M (44)
Hence, xi,k =
(pk
pj
) 1
ρ−1
(ai,k
ai,j
) ρ
1−ρ
xi,j , ∀k ∈M. (45)
At the optimality, λi > 0, hence,
∑
k pkxi,k = Bi. Substitut-
ing value of every xi,k from (45), we can compute the value
of xi,j and infer the value of every xi,k, ∀k ∈ M.We obtain
the optimal solution as shown in (39). Note that this optimal
solution is positive.
Next, consider (P2), which is the sub-problem to be
solved by every service i. Define fi(xi) = Bi lnui(xi) −∑
j pjxi,j , where ui(xi) =
∑
j
(
ai,jxi,j
)ρ
. Take the first
derivative and set it to be equal to zero, we have
∂fi(xi)
∂xi,j
= Biρai,j
(
ai,jxi,j
)ρ−1
ui(xi)
− pj = 0, ∀j (46)
⇒ Biρa
ρ
i,jx
ρ−1
i,j = pjui(xi), ∀j. (47)
Following similar steps as for (P1) above, we obtain the
closed form expression of the optimal solution of (P2).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.1
The EG convex program is
maximize
X ,u
N∑
i=1
Bi lnui (48)
subject to
ui =
M∑
j=1
ai,jxi,j , ∀i (49)
N∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j (50)
xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j. (51)
Let ηi, pj , and νi,j be the dual variables associated with
(49), (50), and (51), respectively. The Lagrangian function of
the EG program (48)-(51) is
L(u,X , η, p, ν) =
∑
i
Bi lnui +
∑
j
pj(1−
∑
i
xi,j) (52)
+
∑
i
ηi
(∑
j
ai,jxi,j − ui
)
+
∑
i
∑
j
νi,jxi,j .
Define fi(ui) = −Bi lnui, we have
L(u,X , η, p, ν) =
∑
i
(
− ηiui − fi(ui)
)
+
∑
j
pj (53)
+
∑
i
∑
j
(
− pj + ηiai,j + νi,j
)
xi,j .
The dual function is
g(η, p, ν) = maximize
u,X
L(u,X , η, p, ν). (54)
The dual problem is
minimize
η≥0,p≥0,ν≥0
g(η, p, ν). (55)
According to the KKT conditions, we have
∂L(u,X , η, p, ν)
∂xi,j
= −pj + ηiai,j + νi,j = 0, ∀i, j (56)
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which gives us −pj + ηiai,j = −νi,j ≤ 0, ∀i, j. Thus,
ηiai,j ≤ pj , ∀i, j. Furthermore, the dual objective is equiv-
alent to
min
η,p,ν
(
max
u
∑
i
(
− ηiui − fi(ui)
)
+
∑
j
pj
)
(57)
= min
η,p,ν
(∑
j
pj +
∑
i
max
u
(
− ηiui − fi(ui)
))
= min
η,p,ν
(∑
j
pj +
∑
i
f∗i (−ηi)
))
.
Note that the (Fenchel) conjugate function of a function h :
R
n → R is defined as follows [32].
h∗(µ) := sup
x
{
µTx− h(x)
}
. (58)
We need to compute the conjugate of fi(ui) = −Bi lnui.
Consider function h(x) = −A lnx where A is a constant.
First, we have the conjugate of h1(x) = − lnx is h∗1(µ) =
−1− ln(−µ). Also, the conjugate function has the following
property [32]: if h2(x) = Ah1(x) for some constant A, then
h∗2(µ) = Ah
∗
1(
µ
A ). Thus, the conjugate of h(x) = −A lnx
is h∗(µ) = −A − A ln
(
−µ
A
)
= −A + A lnA − A ln(−µ).
Therefore, the conjugate of fi(ui) is
f∗i (µi) = −Bi +Bi lnBi −Bi ln(−µi). (59)
By ignoring the constant terms (−Bi + Bi lnBi), the dual
objective is equivalent to
min
η,p,ν
(∑
j
pj −
∑
i
Bi ln ηi
)
. (60)
We have shown that the convex program (61) can be inferred
directly from the EG convex program (48)-(51).
minimize
p,η
M∑
j=1
pj −
N∑
i=1
Bi ln(ηi) (61)
subject to pj ≥ ai,jηi, ∀i, j; pj ≥ 0, ∀j.
Note that it can be verified that the KKT conditions of prob-
lems (61) and (48)-(51) are equivalent, where xi,j is the dual
variable corresponding to the first constraint of problem
(61). Hence, problem (61) captures themarket clearing prices
(i.e. equilibrium prices).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 7.2
Consider problems (P3) and (P4) as follows
(P3) minimize
p,η
M∑
j=1
pj −
N∑
i=1
Bi ln(ηi) (62)
subject to
pj ≥ ai,jηi, ∀i, j; ηi ≤ 1, ∀i; ηi ≥ 0, ∀i; pj ≥ 0, ∀j.
(P4) maximize
X ,u,s
N∑
i=1
(
Bi lnui − si
)
(63)
subject to
ui ≤
M∑
j=1
ai,jxi,j + si, ∀i
N∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j;xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j; si ≥ 0, ∀i.
- Dual program construction: First we show that the
convex program (P4) is the dual program of (P3). This
can be shown in a similar way to proof of Proposition 7.1
as follows. Let λi,j , θi, γi, and υj be the dual variables
associated with constraints the first, second, third, and last
constraints in problem (P3), respectively. The Lagrangian of
problem (62) is
L(p, η, λ, θ, γ, υ) =
∑
j
pj −
∑
i
Bi ln ηi −
∑
i
γiηi (64)
+
∑
i
∑
j
λi,j
(
ai,jηi − pj
)
+
∑
i
θi(ηi − 1)−
∑
j
υjpj.
Define fi(ηi) = Bi ln ηi, we have
L(p, η, λ, θ, γ, υ) =
∑
j
(1−
∑
i
λi,j − υj)pj (65)
+
∑
i
(
(
∑
j
λi,jai,j + θi − γi)ηi − fi(ηi)
)
−
∑
i
θi.
The dual function is
g(λ, θ, γ, υ) = minimize
p,η
L(p, η, λ, θ, γ, υ). (66)
The dual problem is
maximize
λ≥0,θ≥0,γ≥0,υ≥0
g(λ, θ, γ, υ). (67)
The rest of this construction is similar to Proposition 7.1. By
setting xi,j = λi,j , si = θi, and ui =
∑
j λi,jai,j + θi − γi,
we can obtain problem (P4).
- Main proof of of theorem 7.2. We need to show that
the solution of (P4) is an exact ME. At the equilibrium, total
money spent and surplus money of every service equals to
its budget, i.e.,
∑
j pjxi,j + si = Bi, ∀i. Additionally, the
optimal utility of every service is unique. Clearly, (P4) can
be written in the following form.
maximize
X
N∑
i=1
(
Bi ln
(
si +
M∑
j=1
ai,jxi,j
)
− si
)
(68)
subject to N∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j (69)
xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j (70)
si ≥ 0, ∀i. (71)
Let pj , νi,j , and βi be the dual variables corresponding to
(69), (70), and (71), respectively. The Lagrangian is
L(X , s, p, ν, β) =
∑
i
(
Bi ln
(
si +
M∑
j=1
ai,jxi,j
)
− si
)
(72)
+
∑
j
pj(1−
∑
i
xi,j) +
∑
i
∑
j
νi,jxi,j +
∑
i
siβi.
Since the feasible region of (68)-(70) is closed, compact, and
convex, Slater’s condition holds and the KKT conditions are
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necessary and sufficient for optimality. The KKT conditions
render
∂L
∂si
= Bi
1
ui(xi, si)
− 1 + βi = 0, ∀i (73)
∂L
∂xi,j
= Bi
ai,j
ui(xi, si)
− pj + νi,j = 0, ∀i, j (74)
pj(1−
∑
i
xi,j) = 0, ∀j; νi,jxi,j = 0, ∀i, j (75)
siβi = 0, ∀i; pj ≥ 0, ∀j; βi ≥ 0, ∀i; νi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j. (76)
where ui(xi, si) = si +
∑
j ai,jxi,j , ∀i. For simplicity, we
will write ui(xi, si) as ui. It can be inferred from (73)-(76)
the following
∀i, j :
ui
Bi
≤
ai,j
pj
(77)
∀i, j : if xi,j > 0⇒ νi,j = 0⇒
ui
Bi
=
ai,j
pj
(78)
∀j : pj > 0⇒
∑
i
xi,j = 1;
∑
i
xi,j < 1⇒ pj = 0. (79)
Similar to the analysis of the EG program, conditions (77)
and (87) imply that xi,j > 0 if and only if j ∈ Di(p),
i.e., each service buys resources only from ENs giving it
the MBB. This also maximizes ui. Next, we show that total
money spent and surplus money of every service equals to
its budget. From (73), we have
Bi
si
ui
− si + siβi = 0, ∀i (80)
Since siβi = 0, ∀i, we have
Bi
si
ui
= si, ∀i (81)
Similarly, since νi,jxi,j = 0, by multiplying both sides of
(74) by xi,j , we have
Bi
ai,jxi,j
ui
= pjxi,j , ∀i (82)
From (81) and (82), we have
Bi
si
ui
+
∑
j
Bi
ai,jxi,j
ui
= si +
∑
j
pjxi,j , ∀i, j (83)
Hence, Bi = si +
∑
j pjxi,j , ∀i, j. From (73) and (76), if
si > 0 ⇒ βi = 0, ∀i ⇒ ui = Bi, ∀i. Therefore, if a
buyer has surplus, her utility is equal to her budget. It means
buying resources or not does not change her utility since she
can keep her money and buy nothing and still has a utility
which equals to her budget. This happens when there is
no ENs with prices strictly lower than the buyer’s utilities
gained from the ENs (i.e., pj ≥ ai,j , ∀j). Finally, the utility
of a buyer with no surplus money is always greater or equal
to the her budget, i.e., ui ≥ Bi, which can be inferred from
(73) and βi ≥ 0.
APPENDIX D
CONCAVE HOMOGENEOUS UTILITY FUNCTIONS
Indeed, the EG program not only captures the Fisher market
with linear utilities [9] but also applies to a wider class of
concave homogeneous (degree one) utility functions [10].
The proof can be found in [8]. We present the proof here for
completeness. The EG program can be written as follows.
maximize
X ,u
N∑
i=1
Bi lnui(xi) (84)
subject to
N∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j; xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j. (85)
Define x∗i as the optimal solution to the EG program. Let pj
and νi,j be dual variables. The KKT conditions give us
pj
(
1−
∑
i
x∗i,j
)
= 0, ∀ j (86)
x∗i,jνi,j = 0, ∀i, j (87)
Bi
ui(x∗i )
∂ui(x
∗
i )
∂xi,j
= pj − νi,j , ∀ i, j. (88)
For every service i, multiply both sides of (88) by x∗i,j and
sum up the resulting equalities, we have
Bi
ui(x∗i )
∑
j
x∗i,j
∂ui(x
∗
i )
∂xi,j
=
∑
j
(pj − νi,j)x
∗
i,j . (89)
From the Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions, we
have ui(xi) =
∑
j xi,j
∂ui
∂xi,j
for homogeneous function ui.
Also, combined with (87), we have
Bi =
∑
j
pjx
∗
i,j . (90)
Thus, x∗i exhausts the budget of buyer i at price p.
We now show that x∗i maximizes ui(xi). Let x
′
i ∈ R
M
+ be
any allocation to buyer i satisfying
∑
j pjx
′
i,j ≤ Bi. From
the concavity of ui, we have.
ui(x
′
i)− ui(x
∗
i ) ≤ ∇ui(x
∗
i )(x
′
i − x
∗
i ) (91)
=
ui(x
∗
i )
Bi
∑
j
(pj − νi,j)(x
′
i,j − x
∗
i,j)
=
ui(x
∗
i )
Bi
(∑
j
(pjx
′
i,j − νi,jx
′
i,j)−Bi
)
≤
ui(x
∗
i )
Bi
(∑
j
pjx
′
i,j −Bi
)
≤ 0.
Therefore, x∗i is an optimal demand bundle of buyer i at
price vector p. Hence, every buyer is allocated its optimal
resource bundle at the equilibrium prices. The market clear-
ing condition proof is similar to that of the linear utility case
in the manuscript. We have shown that all the requirements
of an ME are satisfied.
APPENDIX E
OTHER DISCUSSIONS
- Net profit maximization and concave homogeneous revenue
functions: Instead of linear revenue function ui(xi) as con-
sidered throughout this work, here, we consider the case
where ui(xi) is concave and homogeneous of degree one.
Then, let gi(xi, si) = uixi + si. For any constant d > 0:
gi(dxi, dsi) = uidxi + dsi = dui(xi) + dsi (92)
= d
(∑
j
ai,jxi,j + si
)
= dui(xi, si), ∀ i.
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Thus, gi(xi, si) is a concave homogeneous (of degree one)
function. By following similar the proof above in Appendix
D for the EG program, we can verify that our new convex
optimization problem (as shown below) for the net profit
maximization model also applies to the wider class of con-
cave homogeneous functions.
maximize
X ,u,s
N∑
i=1
(
Bi ln(ui(xi) + si)− si
)
(93)
subject to
N∑
i=1
xi,j ≤ 1, ∀j;xi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j; si ≥ 0, ∀i.
- Multiple resource types: Consider an example of the
model with multiple resource types. For example, a service
may need a combination of bandwidth, computing, and
memory. Let di = (di,1, ..., di,K) be the base demand vector
giving service i, in which di,k is the amount of resource k in
the base demand vector of service i. The utility of service
i is commonly defined as follows: ui(xi) = mink{
xi,k
di,k
}.
It is easy to see that ui(xi) is concave and homogeneous
of degree one. If there are multiple ENs, we will take sum
utility over all the ENs. Therefore, the proposed framework
can apply to the multi-resource case.
- Another decentralized implementation of the basic model
(revenue maximization): By carefully analyzing the central-
ized combinatorial algorithm proposed for the linear Fisher
market in the remarkable piece of work of by N.R. Devanur
et. al. [22], we observe that it can be modified to work
in a distributed fashion as follows. In each round, given
new prices, instead of reporting its optimal bundle(s), each
service will report its maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) value
and the ENs in its demand set Di. The platform will
collect these information to construct and compute a new
equality graph as defined in [22], and compute a balance
flow (maxflow with minimum surplus). By this small mod-
ification, the combinatorial algorithm in [22] can be imple-
mented in decentralized manner. The algorithm terminates
when the max-flow is equal to the total budget of the buyers.
Note that before the prices converge to equilibrium prices,
the total budget of the buyers and the total prices of the ENs
are different, which means the intermediate solution does
not satisfy the market clearing condition. Interested readers
can refer to [22] for more details.
